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for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
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* The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie retired from the Court 
on January 1, 2019 after the argument and conference in this 
case, but before the filing of the opinion.  This opinion is filed 
by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and 
Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12.  
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___________  
  
OPINION OF THE COURT  
____________   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
  
In June of 2016, Maliki Hassan Chapman pled guilty 
to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine.  
After several continuances, the District Court set a date for 
Chapman’s sentencing hearing in March of 2017.  On the 
scheduled date, Chapman immediately informed the Court 
that he was never told of the hearing due to his counsel’s error 
and therefore had been unable to notify his family of his 
sentencing.  He requested a continuance so that his family 
could be present and provide the Court with letters of support.  
The District Court acknowledged that defense counsel’s error 
caused Chapman’s lack of notice but denied the request, 
stating that proceeding with the sentencing as scheduled 
would not impact his substantive rights.  We disagree.  The 
Court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion because it 
interfered with Chapman’s right to allocution as codified in 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows a 
defendant to present any information that could persuade a 
court to impose a lesser sentence.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(i)(4)(A).  Because the District Court’s ruling 
impermissibly contravened the principles underlying Rule 32, 
we vacate Chapman’s sentence and remand the case for a re-
sentencing.   
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I.  
 
  For several years, Chapman engaged in the selling of 
narcotics in Williamsport and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  He 
would supply sellers with cocaine purchased from a source in 
New Jersey.  Chapman had hidden compartments installed in 
his cars to facilitate the transportation of cocaine.  His 
business generated significant amounts of cash; on December 
12, 2012, police officers recovered over $75,000 from his 
hotel room in a township near Harrisburg.    
 
  As the business progressed, Chapman supplied cocaine 
to sellers working for a coconspirator, Chris Batten.  In April 
of 2013, Pennsylvania State Police recovered approximately 
22 ounces of cocaine powder from the trunk of Chapman’s 
car during a traffic stop in Lancaster County.  In May of the 
following year, police found $32,060 in cash in Chapman’s 
car pursuant to a traffic stop in Montgomery County.  
  
  On June 2, 2016, Chapman pled guilty to conspiracy to 
possess with the intent to distribute at least three and a half, 
but less than five, kilograms of cocaine.  Chapman had two 
prior felony convictions and qualified as a career offender.  
With a three level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, 
the applicable guideline imprisonment range was 188 to 235 
months.  In exchange for the plea, the government agreed to 
recommend a sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment.  The 
government also agreed that Chapman could request a 
sentence lower than the guideline range, but not lower than 
144 months imprisonment.  
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  On November 1, 2016, the District Court ordered that 
Chapman’s sentencing be held November 30, 2016.  On 
November 29, 2016, Chapman’s counsel filed an unopposed 
motion to continue sentencing until February 2017, which the 
District Court granted.  The parties had a status conference on 
December 2, 2016 and agreed to defer sentencing for 
approximately six weeks.  On February 2, 2017, the day after 
conferring with the parties, the District Court issued an order 
setting March 10, 2017 as the date for Chapman’s sentencing.  
 
  On that date, Chapman immediately told the District 
Court that he did not know he was to be sentenced that day 
and, had he known, his family would have been present in the 
courtroom.  He asked for a continuance of “at least a week,” 
so that he “could send [the Court] letters” from both himself 
and his family members.  Chapman                                                         
acknowledged that the letters might not “help” him, but he 
believed they would “just show [the Court] a little bit of 
things about [him].”  Appendix 60.1    
                                              
1 Chapman testified as follows:  
  
  Good afternoon, Your Honor.  Yes.  My concern 
is that is that I didn’t know nothing about this, 
about my sentencing. . . . My family wasn’t 
notified that I had court.  They support me and 
they would be here.  And I have letters that 
support.  And just a lot of things that I didn’t 
know about that I think maybe – I can’t say it 
would help me, but it would just show you a little 
bit of things about me.  
  
Case: 17-1656     Document: 003113155151     Page: 5      Date Filed: 02/07/2019
 6  
 
The District Court acknowledged that Chapman’s 
counsel “misread a prior scheduling order,” but denied the 
request for a continuance.  Appendix 60.  The Court stated: “I 
know what I think I need to know about your case,” adding 
that it would grant the continuance “despite [its] irritation” 
with counsel if Chapman’s substantive rights were impacted 
by sentencing him as scheduled.  Appendix 63.  The District 
Court assured Chapman that its “pique” at his counsel would 
not “in any way affect” the sentence Chapman was about to 
receive.  Appendix 63.     
 
  The District Court asked Chapman if he had the 
opportunity to review his presentence report with his counsel, 
to which Chapman responded he had not.  After conferencing 
with his counsel at the direction of the Court, Chapman 
amended his answer and stated that he and his counsel “had a 
brief discussion by telephone.  Nothing in person.”  Appendix 
                                              
  This is just – this is, like, um – I just didn’t know 
nothing about this, Your Honor.  I would ask if 
maybe I could get like a reschedule maybe for at 
least a week or something so I can send you 
letters, because I have letters that I wanted to 
send you and my family wanted to send you.   
  
Appendix 59-60.  Chapman also requested the continuance so 
that he and his counsel could review the presentence memo, 
which he stated they “never went over.”  Appendix 60.  This 
grounds for a continuance was not raised as an issue on 
appeal.   
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66.  Chapman’s counsel presented two objections to the 
report, both of which were overruled by the Court.   
 
  Chapman’s counsel spoke on his behalf, referencing a 
letter Chapman had sent to the District Court prior to the 
sentencing.  The District Court stated that it had read the 
letter, twice, and then asked Chapman if he would like to 
address the Court regarding what he believed it “should 
consider in imposing sentence[.]”  Appendix 76.   Chapman 
accepted the invitation and told the District Court that he had 
recently finished a second letter but did not have it with him, 
again stating that he was “kind of caught off guard” by the 
sentencing hearing.  Appendix 76.     
 
  The District Court sentenced Chapman to a 192 month 
term of imprisonment.2  Chapman appealed to this Court, 
claiming the District Court’s decision to impose sentence 
without allowing him to present mitigating information he 
would have provided had he had notice of his sentencing 
violated his right to allocution.  
                                              
2 We note that the government’s recommendation of a 
sentence of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment violated the 
terms of the plea agreement, which stated that the government 
would recommend a flat term of 188 months’ imprisonment.  
The government acknowledges this error, but states that a 
violation of the plea agreement is not an issue on appeal.  
This is correct.  However, given that the fairness of 
Chapman’s sentencing is at issue, the government’s decision 
to ask for a term of imprisonment longer than the one agreed 
upon by the parties further compromises the perceived equity 
of the sentencing process.   
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II.  
 
Initially, we find Chapman’s contemporaneous 
comments to the District Court requesting a continuance 
sufficient to preserve this issue on appeal.  While Chapman’s 
counsel did not object, Chapman himself immediately 
protested once it became clear the Court intended to proceed 
with sentencing.  After acknowledging that Chapman’s 
ignorance as to his sentencing date was his own counsel’s 
fault, the Court denied Chapman’s request for a continuance, 
stating that the denial did not result in a violation of his 
substantive rights.  In this statement, the District Court 
enunciated the precise issue raised on appeal: whether 
imposing sentence despite Chapman’s justified inability to 
provide mitigating information he had anticipated presenting 
to the Court improperly limited his right to allocution.  
Accordingly, the issue is preserved.  See United States v. 
Feng Li, 115 F.3d 125, 132 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 3A Charles 
Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal 2d § 
851, at 294 (2d ed. 1982)).    
 
We review the District Court’s denial of Chapman’s 
request for a continuance for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245-246 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citations omitted).  Because there is no “mechanical test [ ]” 
to determine if an abuse has occurred, we examine the 
particular circumstances of each case.  Id. (quoting Unger v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)).  When deciding a motion 
for a continuance, a court should consider the efficient 
administration of criminal justice, the accused's rights, and the 
rights of other defendants who may be prejudiced by a 
continuance.  United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.3d 72, 73 (3d 
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Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 
750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir. 1984)).     
 
Upon examining the particular circumstances of this 
sentencing, it is plain the District Court erred by denying 
Chapman’s request to postpone his sentencing.  In so doing, 
the Court unfairly deprived Chapman of his right to a full and 
meaningful allocution.  Because preserving Chapman’s right 
to allocution outweighs the other relevant considerations, the 
Court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.   
 
Having found that Chapman’s preserved claim has 
merit, we review the District Court’s abuse of discretion 
under the harmless error doctrine to determine whether a 
substantial right was impacted.  See Fed. R. Crim P. 52(a); 
United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 284 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001).  
While not constitutionally protected, the right to allocution is 
deemed a substantial right because it could influence a court’s 
sentencing decision.  United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 250 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Allocution is “ancient in origin, and it is the 
type of important safeguard that helps assure the fairness, and 
hence, legitimacy, of the sentencing process.”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d at 288).  While defendants 
have been granted additional rights and procedural safeguards 
over time, “[n]one of these modern innovations lessens the 
need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to 
present to the court his plea in mitigation.”  Paladino, 769 
F.3d at 200 (quoting Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 
304 (1961) (plurality opinion)).  The Supreme Court in Green 
recognized that “[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be 
able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with 
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halting eloquence, speak for himself.”  Green, 365 U.S. at 
304.    
 
Congress codified the right to allocution in 1944 by 
promulgating Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which 
instructs that “before imposing sentence, the court must . . . 
address defendant personally in order to permit the 
defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the 
sentence.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. 
Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Adams, 252 
F.3d at 280, and Green, 365 U.S. at 304).  This Court has 
determined that the “critical purpose” of allocution is 
threefold: “1) to allow the defendant to present mitigating 
circumstances, 2) to permit the defendant to present personal 
characteristics to enable the sentencing court to craft an 
individualized sentence, and (3) to preserve the appearance 
of fairness in the criminal justice system.”  Ward, 732 F.3d 
at 181.  When the purpose served by allocution is 
compromised, prejudice against the defendant is presumed 
and a re-sentencing is warranted.  Adams, 252 F.3d at 281.   
 
Information that could potentially mitigate a sentence 
draws from a wide range of sources.  Accordingly, Rule 32 
grants a defendant the broad right to present “any” material he 
believes might appeal to the court’s compassion.  When a 
court unjustifiably limits a defendant’s ability to introduce 
information he reasonably believes is “the best case for 
mitigating the sentence,” the purpose underlying allocution is 
thwarted.  United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th 
Cir. 2008).  Moreover, unduly limiting allocution 
compromises a court’s own ability to sentence the individual 
standing before it and to “temper punishment with mercy in 
appropriate cases.”  United States v. Ward,  
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732 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. De 
Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)).  Given that an 
inclusive allocution better informs the sentencing decision, a 
court should encourage a defendant to present all available 
relevant and illuminating information.  
 
  Of course, a defendant’s right to allocution is not 
without limitations.  “The sentencing judge has always 
retained the discretion to place certain restrictions on what 
may be presented during an allocution.”  Ward, 732 F.3d at 
182.  A district court is entitled to require that a defendant’s 
comments remain germane to determining what sentence 
should be imposed.  United States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 658 
(9th Cir. 2000).   
 
But a court’s limitation as to duration and scope must 
not subvert the policy goals underlying Rule 32, which are to 
grant a defendant the opportunity to explain why he is worthy 
of mercy.  United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Ward, 732 F.3d at 182).  See also Bustamante-
Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1991)) 
(“The right to allocution is the right to have your request for 
mercy factored into the sentencing decision.”)    
 
Here, Chapman was deprived of the opportunity to 
fully plead his case for mercy through no fault of his own.   
He testified that his family intended to provide the Court with 
supportive letters, the contents of which Chapman clearly 
believed had the potential to persuade the Court to temper its 
sentence.  Given that family members are often the best 
source of information regarding a defendant’s personal 
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characteristics, this belief was manifestly reasonable.  At a 
minimum the letters could have provided further insight into 
Chapman’s individualized circumstances, thereby enhancing 
the Court’s ability to craft an appropriate punishment.  
Because the letters could have impacted the sentence 
imposed, the Court’s decision to deny their admission 
infringed on Chapman’s right to allocution.  
 
In addition to violating Chapman’s right to present 
mitigating evidence, the District Court improperly 
compromised the appearance of fairness attributed to the 
sentencing hearing. Ward, 732 F.3d at 181.  Allocution 
provides a court with insight into a defendant’s individualized 
circumstances, but also “has value in terms of maximizing the 
perceived equity of the process, because the defendant is 
given the right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior 
to the imposition of sentence.”  Moreno, 809 F.3d at 778 
(quoting De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 129) (emphasis added) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Beyond 
mere symbolic significance, granting a defendant the right to 
speak instills inherent fairness into the proceeding and “lends 
legitimacy to the sentencing process.”  Adams, 252 F.3d at 
288 (quoting United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463-64 
(5th Cir. 1998)).    
 
Instantly the appearance of unfairness is especially 
stark because Chapman’s own counsel thwarted his 
opportunity to present information he believed might best 
speak to the Court’s mercy.  Chapman was instead sentenced 
to a substantial term of imprisonment without the benefit of 
the letters his family had hoped to submit or even their 
presence in the courtroom.  The Court acknowledged 
Chapman’s intention to produce additional mitigating 
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evidence but opined that his sentencing hearing had been 
delayed for long enough.  While it is unquestionably true that 
Chapman’s sentencing had been delayed, it is also true that 
judicial expediency is not served where the imposed sentence 
is the result of a presumably unfair proceeding and must be 
vacated.  Despite the sentencing court’s mention of its 
massive docket, we maintain that even “in an age of  . . . an 
overburdened justice system, courts must continue to be 
cautious to avoid the appearance of dispensing assembly-line 
justice.” United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 
1991).  The denial of the right to allocution, which enables the 
sentencing court to craft appropriate sentences, “is not the sort 
of ‘isolated’ or ‘abstract’ error that we might determine does 
not impact the ‘fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.’”  Plotts, 359 F.3d at 251 (citing Adams, 
252 F.3d at 288 (citation omitted)).  Accordingly, we grant 
relief in this case.   
 
Finally, the government argues that Chapman is not 
entitled to relief because he did not identify any “palpable 
prejudice” resulting from the Court’s refusal to allow for the 
submission of additional mitigating information.  Under this 
Court’s jurisprudence, however, prejudice will ordinarily be 
presumed where a defendant’s right to allocution has been 
violated.  Paladino, 769 F.3d at 202-203; Plotts, 359 F.3d at 
249-250.  Prejudice resulting from a violation need not be 
“palpable”; it is sufficient for a defendant to establish there 
was “opportunity for such a violation to have played a role in 
the district court’s sentencing decision.”  Adams, 252 F.3d at 
287.  The Court sentenced Chapman to a sentence of 192 
months’ imprisonment, more than the minimum guideline 
sentence of 188 months.  Chapman’s plea agreement reserved 
the right to advocate for a sentence of 144 months’ 
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imprisonment, which his counsel did at his sentencing 
hearing.  The Court plainly had the discretion to grant 
Chapman a lower sentence than the one imposed.  United 
States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000).  Chapman 
intended to include the letters by his family members in his 
plea for mitigation, and this intention was frustrated due to 
factors beyond his control.  The letters might have provided 
additional persuasive mitigating circumstances not otherwise 
known to the Court.  Regardless of whether the letters would 
have in fact brought about a lesser sentence, the law – as well 
as a sense of basic fairness – dictates that Chapman not be 
prevented from presenting mitigating information because of 
his own counsel’s oversight and the Court’s congested docket.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for 
resentencing.  
 
III.  
 
A resentencing necessitated by a judge’s failure to 
grant a defendant a full and meaningful allocution raises the 
question as to whether the same judge should address the 
resentencing upon remand.  United States v. Navarro-Flores, 
628 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 1980).  Although we recognize 
that, in most cases in which there may be a need for 
resentencing, it is our practice to remand the matter to the 
originally presiding judge, we can exercise our supervisory 
power to reassign the case if we deem that to be the better 
course.  Gov’t of the V.I.  v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 376 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  We do not doubt that, in this case, the able judge 
who has handled the matter would accept whatever additional 
submissions the defense might proffer in connection with a 
resentencing and would endeavor in all good conscience to be 
fair and impartial.  But we are mindful too of the imperative 
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to “preserve not only the reality but also the appearance of the 
proper functioning of the judiciary as a neutral, impartial 
administrator of justice.”  Id. (quoting Alexander v. Primerica 
Holdings, 10 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 1993)).       
 
Here, the District Court must not only meaningfully 
consider on remand the Chapman family’s letters, it must be 
seen by the defendant, his family, and the public at large as 
not being influenced by the prior decision that such letters 
were not substantively significant.  The judge is on record as 
saying he already knew what he needed to know, and that 
statement, unfortunately, could be understood as saying it did 
not matter what Chapman or his family might say in 
mitigation.  Appendix 63.  In this particular circumstance, we 
think it best to remand to a different judge, so that the fairness 
of the sentencing process cannot reasonably be questioned at 
all. 
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